

Report of Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U. S. Army, commanding the Army of the Cumberland.

[OCTOBER , 1863.]

THE OCCUPATION OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE AND PASSAGE OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS.

The rebel army, after its expulsion from Middle Tennessee, crossed the Cumberland Mountains by way of the Tantallon and University roads, then moved down Battle Creek, and crossed the Tennessee River on bridges, it is said, near the mouth of Battle Creek and at Kelleys Ferry, and on the railroad bridge at Bridgeport. They destroyed a part of the latter after having passed over it, and retired to Chattanooga and Tyners Station, leaving guards along the river. On their arrival at Chattanooga, they commenced immediately to throw up some defensive fieldworks at that place and also at each of the crossings of the Tennessee as far up as Blythes Ferry.

Our troops, having pursued the rebels as far as supplies and the state of the roads rendered it practicable, took position from McMinnville to Winchester, with advances at Pelham and Stevenson. The latter soon after moved to Bridgeport in time to save from total destruction a saw-mill there, but not to prevent the destruction of the railroad bridge.

After the expulsion of Braggs forces from Middle Tennessee, the next objective point of this army was Chattanooga. It commands the southern entrance into East Tennessee, the most valuable if not the chief sources of supplies of coal for the manufactories and machine-shops of the Southern States, and is one of the great gateways through the mountains to the champaign counties of Georgia and Alabama.

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For the better understanding of the campaign, I submit a brief outline of the topography of the country from the barrens of the northwestern base of the Cumberland range to Chattanooga and its vicinity.

The Cumberland range is a lofty mass of rocks, separating the waters which flow into the Cumberland from those which flow into the Tennessee, and extending from beyond the Kentucky line, in a southwesterly direction, nearly to Athens, Ala. Its

northwestern slopes are steep and rocky, and scalloped into coves, in which are the heads of numerous streams that water Middle Tennessee. Its top is undulating or rough, covered with timber, soil comparatively barren, and in dry seasons scantily supplied with water. Its south-eastern slope, above Chattanooga, for many miles, is precipitous, rough, and difficult all the way up to Kingston. The valley between the foot of this slope and the river seldom exceeds 4 or 5 miles in width, and with the exception of a narrow border along the banks is undulating or hilly.

The Sequatchie Valley is along the river of that name, and is a cañon or deep ~cut, splitting the Cumberland range parallel to its length. It is only 3 or 4 miles in breadth and 50 miles in length. The sides of this valley are even more precipitous than the great eastern and western slopes of the Cumberland which have just been described. To reach Chattanooga from McMinnville or north of the Tennessee it is necessary to turn the head of this valley by Pikeville and pass down the Valley of the Tennessee, or to cross it by Dunlap or Therman.

That part of the Cumberland range between Sequatchie and the Tennessee, called Waldens Ridge, abuts on the Tennessee in high, rocky bluffs, leaving no practicable space sufficient for a good wagon road along the river. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad crosses that branch of the Cumberland range west of the Sequatchie, through a low gap, by a tunnel, 2 miles east of Cowan, down the gorge of Big Crow Creek to Stevenson at the foot of the mountain, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 3 miles from the Tennessee and 10 miles from Bridgeport.

Between Stevenson and Chattanooga, on the south of the Tennessee, are two ranges of mountains, the Tennessee River separating them from the Cumberland, its channel a great chasm cut through the mountain masses, which in those places abut directly on the river. These two ranges are separated by a narrow valley, through which runs Lookout Creek.

The Sand Mountain is next the Tennessee and its northern extremity is called Raccoon Mountain. Its sides are precipitous and its top barren oak ridges, nearly destitute of water. There are but few, and these very difficult, wagon roads, by which to ascend and descend the slopes of this mountain.

East of Lookout Valley is Lookout Mountain a vast palisade of rocks rising 2,400 feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt, rocky cliffs, from a steep wooded base. Its eastern sides are no less precipitous. Its top varies from 1 to 6 or 7 miles in ~readth, is heavily timbered, sparsely settled, and poorly watered. It terminates ab-

ruptly upon the Tennessee, 2 miles below Chattanooga, and the only practicable wagon roads across it are one over the nose of the mountain, at this point, one at Johnsons Crook, 26 miles distant, and one at Winstons Gap, 42 miles distant from Chattanooga

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Between the eastern base of this range and the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta or Georgia State Railroad are a series of narrow valleys separated by smaller ranges of hills or low mountains, over which there are quite a number of practicable wagon roads running eastward toward the railroad.

The first of these ranges is Missionary Ridge, separating the waters of Chickamauga from Chattanooga Creek.

A higher range with fewer gaps, on the southeast side of the Chickamauga, is Pigeon Mountain, branching from Lookout, near Dougherty's Gap, some 40 miles south from Chattanooga. It extends in a northerly direction, bearing eastward until it is lost in the general level of the country, near the line of the Chattanooga and Lafayette road.

East of these two ranges and of the Chickamauga, starting from Ooltewah and passing by Ringgold to the west of Dalton, is Taylors Ridge, a rough, rocky range, traversable by wagon roads only through gaps, generally several miles apart.

Missionary Ridge passes about 3 miles east of Chattanooga, ending near the Tennessee at the mouth of the Chickamauga. Taylors Ridge separates the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad from the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad.

The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylors Ridge and west of the rough mountain region, in which are the sources of the Coosa River. This valley, only about 9 or 10 miles wide, is the natural southern gateway into East Tennessee, while the other valleys just mentioned terminate northwardly on the Tennessee to the west of it, and extend in a southwesterly direction toward the line of the Coosa, the general direction of which, from the crossing of the Atlanta road to Rome and thence to Gadsden, is southwest.

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From the position of our army at McMinnville, Tullahoma, Decherd, and Winchester, to reach Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee above it, it was necessary either to pass north of the Sequatchie Valley, by Pikeville or Kingston, or to cross the main Cumberland and the Sequatchie Valley, by Dunlap or Therman and Waldens Ridge, by the routes passing through these places, a distance from 65 to 70 miles, over a country destitute of forage, poorly supplied with water, by narrow and difficult wagon roads.

The main Cumberland range could also have been passed, on an inferior road, by Pelham and Tracy City to Therman.

The most southerly route on which to move troops and transportation to the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, was by Cowan, University, Battle Creek, and Jasper or by Tantaloon, Anderson, Stevenson, Bridgeport, and the mouth of Battle Creek, to same point, and thence by Therman or Dunlap and Poes Tavern, across Waldens Ridge. The University road, though difficult, was the best of these two, that by Cowan, Tantaloon, and Stevenson being very rough between Cowan and Anderson and much longer.

There were also three roads across the mountains to the Tennessee River below Stevenson, the best but much the longest by Fayetteville and Athens, a distance of 70 miles.

The next, a very rough wagon road from Winchester, by Salem, to Larkinsville, and an exceedingly rough road by the way of Mount Top, one branch leading thence to Bellefonte and the other to Stevenson.

On these latter routes little or no forage was to be found except at Fayetteville, PT

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the extremities of the lines, and they were also scarce of water. The one by Athens has both forage and water in abundance.

It is evident from this description of the topography that to reach Chattanooga, or to penetrate the country south of it, on the railroad, by crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga was a difficult task. It was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains, with subsistence, ammunition, at least a limited supply of forage, and a bridge train; to cross Sand or Raccoon Mountains into Lookont Valley, then Lookont Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges, Missionary Ridge, if we went

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directly to Chattanooga, or Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylors Ridge, if we struck the railroad at Dalton or south of it. The Valley of the Tennessee River, though several miles in breadth between the bases of the mountains, below Bridgeport, is not a broad, arid farming country, but full of barren oak ridges, sparsely settled, and but a small part of it under cultivation.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY UNTIL IT REACHED THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

The first step was to repair the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, to bring forward to Tullahoma, McMinnville, Decherd, and Winchester needful forage and subsistence, which it was impossible to transport from Murfreesborough to those points over the horrible roads which we encountered on our advance to Tullahoma. The next was to extend the repairs of the main stem to Stevenson and Bridgeport, and the Tracy City branch, so that we could place supplies in depot at those points, from which to draw after we had crossed the mountains.

Through the zeal and energy of Colonel Limes and his regiment of Michigan Engineers, the main road was opened to the Elk River Bridge by the 13th of July, and Elk River Bridge and the main stem to Bridgeport by the 25th, and the branch to Tracy City by the 13th of August.

As soon as the main stem was finished to Stevenson, Sheridans division was advanced, two brigades to Bridgeport and one to Stevenson, and commissary and quartermaster stores pushed forward to the latter place with all practicable speed. These supplies began to be accumulated at this point in sufficient quantities by the 8th of August, and corps commanders were that day directed to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for a general movement.

The Tracy City branch, built for hauling coal down the mountains, has such high grades and sharp curves as to require a peculiar engine. The only one we had answering the purpose, having been broken on its way from Nashville, was not repaired until about the 12th of August. It was deemed best, therefore, to delay the movement of the troops until that road was completely available for transporting stores to Tracy City.

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THE MOVEMENT OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS began on the morning of the 16th of August, as follows:

General Crittendens corps in three columns, General Wood, from Hillsborough, by Pelham to Therman, in Sequatchie Valley.

General Palmer, from Manchester by the most practicable route to Dunlap

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General Van Cleve, with two brigades from McMinnville the third being left in garrison thereby the most practicable route to Pikeville, the head of the Sequatchie Valley.

Colonel Mintys cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, to drive back Dibrells cavalry toward Kingston, where the enemys mounted troops, under Forrest, were concentrated, and then, covering the left flank of Van Cleves column, to proceed to Pikeville.

The Fourteenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas commanding, moved as follows:

General Reynolds, from University, by way of Battle Creek, to take post concealed near its mouth.

General Brannan to follow him.

General Negley to go by Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek, between Anderson and Stevenson.

General Baird to follow him and camp near Anderson.

The Twentieth Corps, Maj. Gen. A. McD. McCook commanding, moved as follows:

General Johnson by Salem and Larkins Fork to Bellefonte.

General Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek, to near Stevenson.

The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens, to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg np.

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On his arrival in the Sequatchie Valley, General Crittenden was to send a brigade of infantry to reconnoiter the Tennessee near Harrison's Landing, and take post at Poes Cross-Roads. Minty was to reconnoiter from Washington down, and take post at Smiths Cross-Roads, and Wilders brigade of mounted infantry was to reconnoiter from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga and be supported by a brigade of infantry, which General Crittenden was to send from Sherman to the foot of the eastern slope of Waldens Ridge, in front of Chattanooga.

These movements were completed by the evening of the 20th of August. Hazens brigade made the reconnoissance on Harrison's Landing, and reported the enemy throwing up works there, and took post at Poes Cross-Roads on the 21st. Wagner, with his brigade, supported Wilder in his reconnoissance on Chattanooga, which they surprised and shelled from across the river~ creating no little agitation.

Thus the army passed the first great barrier between it and the objective point, and arrived opposite the enemy on the banks of the Tennessee. THE CROSSING OF THE RIVER required that the best points should be chosen, and means provided for the crossing. The river was reconnoitered, the pontoons and trains ordered forward as rapidly as possible, hidden from view in rear of Stevenson and prepared for use. By the time they were ready the places of crossing had been selected and dispositions made to begin the operation.

It was very desirable to conceal to the last moment~ the points of crossing, but as the mountains on the south side of the Tennessee rise in precipitous rocky bluffs to the height of 800 or 1,000 feet, completely overlooking the whole valley and its coves, this was next to impossible.

IN 4 liaviiiio- ~)llt 00115 for two l)ri(I ges across tue river, General ~lieriAaii l~~gaii trestlexyuik for pai-ts ol one ut Bridgeport, whil
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General Reynolds division, seizing Sheilmound, captured some boats, and from these and material picked up prepared the means of crossing at that point, and General Brannan prepared rafts for crossing his troops at the mouth of Battle Creek.

The laying of the pontoon bridge at Captains Ferry was very handsomely done by the troops of General Davis, under the directions of General McCook, who crossed

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his advance in pontoons at daylight, driving the enemys cavalry from the opposite side. The bridge was ready for crossing by 11 a. m. the same day, but in plain view from the rebel signal stations opposite Bridgeport.

The bridge at Bridgeport was finished on the 29th of August, but an accident occurred which delayed its final completion till September 2.

THE MOVEMENT ACROSS THE RIVER was commenced on the 29th and completed on the 4th of September, leaving the regular brigade in charge of the railroad and depot at Stevenson until relieved by Major-General Granger, who was directed, as soon as practicable, to relieve it and take charge of the rear.

General Thomas corps was to cross as follows:

One division at Capertons and
one at Bridgeport,
Reynolds at Shellmound in boats,
and one division at Battle Creek on rafts.

All were to use the bridge at Bridgeport for such portions of their trains as they might find necessary, and to concentrate near Trenton, and send an advance to seize Fricks or Coopers and Stevens Gaps on the Lookout Mountain, the only practicable routes leading down the mountains into the valley called Mcbemores Cove, which lies at its eastern base and stretches northeastwardly toward Chattanooga.

General McCooks corps was to cross
two divisions at Capertons Ferry, move to Valley Head, and seize Winstons Gap, while
Sheridan was to cross at Bridgeport as soon as the bridge was laid and join the rest of his corps near Winstons, by way of Trenton.

General Crittendens corps was ordered down the Sequatchie, leaving the two advanced brigades, under Hazen and Wagner, with Mintys cavalry and Wilders mounted infantry to watch and annoy the enemy. It was to cross the river, following Thomas corps at all three crossings, and to take post on the Murphys Hollow road, push an advance brigade to reconnoiter the enemy at the foot of Lookout, and take post at Wauhatchie, communicating from his main body with Thomas on the right lip the Trenton Valley and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout.

The cavalry, crossed at Capertons and a ford near Island Creek, were to unite in Lookout Valley, take post at Rawlingsville, and reconnoiter boldly toward Rome and Alpine.

These movements were completed by McCooks and Crittendens corps on the 6th, and by Thomas corps on the 8th of September. The cavalry for some reason was not pushed with the vigor nor to the extent which orders and the necessities of the campaign required. Its continual movement since that period and the absence of Major-General Stanley, the chief of cavalry, have prevented a report which may throw some light on the subject.

The first barrier south of the Tennessee being crossed, the enemy was found firmly holding the point of Lookout Mountain with infantry and artillery, while our force on the north side of the river Page 53 CHAP. XLII.] THE CHICKAMALIGA CAMPAIGN. 53 reported the movement of the rebel forces from East Tennessee and their concentration at Chattanooga. To dislodge him from that place it was necessary to carry Lookout Mountain, or so to move as to compel him to quit his position by endangering his line of communication. The latter plan was chosen.

The cavalry was ordered to advance on our extreme right to Summerville, in Broomtown Valley, and General McCook was ordered to support the movement by a division of infantry thrown forward to the vicinity of Alpine, which was executed on the 8th and 9th of September.

General Thomas was ordered to cross his corps by Fricks or Coopers and Stevens Gaps and occupy the head of McLemores Cove.

General Crittenden was ordered to reconnoiter the front of Lookout Mountain, sending a brigade up an almost impracticable path called the Nickajack trace to Summertown, a hamlet on the summit of the mountain overlooking Chattanooga, and holding the main body of his corps either to support these reconnaissances to prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose of Lookout, or to enter Chattanooga in case the enemy should evacuate it or make but feeble resistance. Simultaneously with this movement, the cavalry was ordered to push by way of Alpine and Broomtown Valley and strike the enemys railroad communication between Resaca bridge and Dalton.

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These movements were promptly begun on the 8th and 9th of September. The reconnoissance of General Crittenden on the 9th developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga the day and night previous and his advance took peaceable possession at 1 p.m.

His whole corps, with its trains, passed around the point of Lookout Mountain on the 10th and encamped for the night at Rossville, 5 miles south of Chattanooga.

During these operations, General Thomas pushed his corps over the mountains at the designated points, each division consuming two days in the passage.

The weight of evidence, gathered from all sources, was that Bragg was moving on Rome, and that his movement began on the 6th of September. General Crittenden was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga, with one brigade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to follow the enemys retreat vigorously, anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringold and Dalton.

Additional information, obtained during the afternoon and the evening of the 10th of September, rendered it certain that his main body had retired by the La Fayette road, but uncertain whether he had gone far. General Crittenden was ordered, at 1 a. m. on the 11th, to proceed to the front and report, directing his command to advance only as far as Ringold, and order a reconnoissance to Gordons Mills. His report, and further evidence, satisfied me that the main body of the rebel army was in the vicinity of La Fayette.

General Crittenden was therefore ordered to move his corps, with all possible dispatch, from Ringold to Gordons Mills, and communicate with General Thomas, who had by that time reached the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain. General Crittenden occupied Ringold during the 11th, pushing Wilders mounted infantry as far as Tunnel Hill, skirmishing heavily with the enemys cavalry. Haze

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joined him near Ringold on the 11th, and the whole corps moved rapidly and successfully across to Gordons Mills on the 12th. Wilder following, and covering the movement, had a severe fight with the enemy at Leets Tan-yard.

During the same day the Fourth U. S. Cavalry was ordered to move up the Dry Valley road, to discover if the enemy was in the proximity of that road on

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Crittendens right, and open communication with Thomas command, which, passing over the mountain, was debouching from Stevens and Coopers Gaps, and moving on La Fayette through Dug Gap of the Pigeon Mountain.

On the 10th, Negleys division advanced to within a mile of Dug Gap, which he found heavily obstructed, and Bairds division came up to his support on the morning of the 11th. Negley became satisfied that the enemy was advancing upon him, in heavy force, and perceiving that if he accepted battle in that position he would probably be cut off, he fell back after a sharp skirmish, in which General Bairds division participated, skillfully covering and securing their trains, to a strong position in front of Stevens Gap. On the 12th, Reynolds and Brannan, under orders to move promptly, closed up to the support of these two advanced divisions.

During the same day General McCook had reached the vicinity of Alpine, and, with infantry and cavalry, had reconnoitered the Broomtown Valley to Summerville, and ascertained that the enemy had not retreated on Rome, but was concentrating at La Fayette.

Thus it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, behind the Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of La Fayette, while the corps of this army were at Gordons Mills, Baileys Cross-Roads, at the foot of Stevens Gap, and at Alpine, a distance of 40 miles, from flank to flank, by the nearest practicable roads, and 57 miles by the route subsequently taken by the Twentieth Army Corps. It had already been ascertained that the main body of Johnstons army had joined Bragg, and an accumulation of evidence showed that the troops from Virginia had reached Atlanta on the 1st of the month, and that reinforcements were expected soon to arrive from that quarter. It was therefore a matter of life and death to effect the **CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY.**

General McCook had already been directed to support General Thomas, but was now ordered to send two brigades to hold Doughertys Gap, and to join General Thomas with the remainder of his command with the utmost celerity, directing his march over the road on the top of the mountain. He had, with great prudence, already moved his trains back to the rear of Little River, on the mountain, but, unfortunately being ignorant of the mountain road, moved down the mountain at Winstons Gap, down Lookout Valley to Coopers Gap, up the mountain and down again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th, and having posted Davis at Brooks, in front of Dug Gap, Johnson at Pond Spring in front of Catletts Gap, and Sheridan at the foot of Stevens Gap.

As soon as General McCooks corps arrived General Thomas moved down the Chickamanga toward Gordons Mills. Meanwhile, to bring General Crittenden within reach of General Thomas and beyond the danger of separation, he was withdrawn from Gordons Mills, on the 14th, and ordered to take post on the southern spur of Missionar Page 55 CHAP. XLII.] 55 THE CIIJCKAMAITGA CAMPAIGN. Ridge, his right commlimicatillg with General Thomas, where he remained until General McCook had effected a junction with, Gen- eral Thomas.

Minty, with his cavalry, reconnoitered the enemy on the 15th and reported him in force at Dalton, Ringgold, and Leets, and Rock Springs Church. The head of General McCooks column being reported near the same day, General Crittenden was ordered to return to his old position at Gordons Mills, his line resting along the Chickamauga via Crawfish Spring.

Thus, on the evening of the ii2th, the troops were substantially within supporting distance. Orders were given at once to move the whole line northeastwardly down the Chickamauga, with a view to covering the La Fayette road toward Chattanooga, and facing the most practicable route to the enemys front.

The position of our troops and the narrowness of the roads retarded our movements. During the day whihe they were in prog- ress, our cavalry, under Colonel Minty, was attacked on the left in the vicinity of Reeds Bridge, and Wilders mounted infantry were attacked by infantry and driven into the La Fayette road.

It became apparent that the enemy was massing heavily on our left, crossing Reeds and Alexanders Bridges in force while he had threatened Gordons Mills.

Orders were therefore promptly given to General Thomas to re- lieve General Crittendens corps, posting one division near Crawfish Spring, and to move with the remainder of his corps by the Widow Glenns house to the Rossville and La Fayette road, his left extend- ing obliquely across it near Kellys house.

General Crittenden was ordered to proceed with Van Cleves and Palmers divisions, to drive the enemy from the Rossville road and form on the left of General Wood, then at Gordons Mills.

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General McCooks corps was to close up on General Thomas, occupy the position at Crawfish Spring, and protect General Crittendens right, while holding his corps mainly in reserve.

The main cavalry force was ordered to close in on General McCooks right, watch the crossing of the Chickamauga, and act under his orders.

The movement for the concentration of the corps more compactly toward Crawfish Spring was begun on the morning of the 18th, under orders to conduct it very secretly, and was executed so slowly that McCooks corps only reached Pond Spring at dark, and bivouacked, resting on their arms during the night. Crittendens corps reached its position on the Rossville road near midnight.

Evidence accumulated during the day of the 18th that the enemy was moving to our left. Mintys cavalry and Wilders mounted brigade encountered the enemys cavalry at Reeds and Alexanders Bridges, and toward evening were driven into the Rossville road. At the same time the enemy had been demonstrating for 3 miles up the Chickamauga. Heavy clouds of dust had been observed 3 or 4 miles beyond the Chickamauga, sweeping to the northeast.

In view of all these facts, the necessity became apparent that General Thomas must use all possible dispatch in moving his corps to the position assigned it. He was therefore directed to proceed with all dispatch, and General McCook to close up to Crawfish Spring as soon as Thomas column was out of the way. Thomas pushed forward uninterruptedly during the night, and at daylight the head of his column had reached Kellys house on the La Fayette road, where Page 56 56 KY., SW. VA., TENN., MISS., N. ALA., AND N. GA. [CHAP. XLII. Bairds division was posted. Brannan followed, and was posted on Bairds left, covering the roads leading to Reeds and Alexanders Bridges.

At this point Colonel McCook, of General Grangers command, who had made a reconnoissance to the Chickamanga the evening before and had burned Reeds Bridge, met General Thomas, and reported that an isolated brigade of the enemy was this side of the Chickamanga, and, the bridge being destroyed, a rapid movement in that direction might result in the capture of the force thus isolated.

General Thomas ordered Brannan with two brigades to reconnoiter in that direction and attack any small force he should meet. The advance brigade, supported by the rest of the division, soon encountered a strong body of the enemy, attacked it

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vigorously, and drove it back more than half a mile, where a very strong column of the enemy was found, with the evident intention of turning our left and gaining possession of the La Fayette road between us and Chatta- nooga.

This vigorous movement disconcerted the plans of the enemy to move on our left, and opened the BATTLE OF THE 19TH SEPTEMBER.

The leading brigade became engaged about 10 a. m. on the 19th, on our extreme left, and extending to the right, where the enemy combined to move in heavy masses. Apprehending this movement, I had ordered General McCook to send Johnsons division to Thomas assistance. He arrived opportunely.

General Crittenden, with great good sense, had already dispatched Palmers, reporting the fact to me, and received my approval. The enemy returned our attack, and was driving back Bairds right in disorder, when Johnson struck the attacking column in flank and drove it back more than a half a mile till his own right was overlapped, and in imminent danger of being turned, when Palmer, coming in on Johnsons right, threw his division against the enemy and drove back his advance columns.

Palmers right was soon overlapped, when Van Cleves division came to his support, but was beaten back, when Reynolds division came in and was in turn overpowered. Davis division came into the fight then, most opportunely, and drove the enemy, who soon, however, developed a superior force against his line and pressed him so heavily that he was giving ground, when Woods division came and turned the tide of battle the other way.

About 3 p. m. General McCook was ordered to send Sheridans division to support our line near Wood and Davis, directing Lytles brigade to hold Gordons Mills, our extreme right. Sheridan also arrived opportunely to save Wood from disaster, and the rebel tide was thoroughly staid in that quarter.

Meanwhile, the roar of musketry in our center grew louder, and evidently approached headquarters at Widow Glenns house, until musket balls came near and shells burst about it. Our center was being driven.

Orders were sent to General Negley to move his division from Crawfish Spring and above, where he had been holding the line of the Chickamauga, to Widow Glenns, to

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be held in reserve to give succor wherever it might be required. At 4.30 p. m. he reported with his division, and as the indications that our center was bein

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General Brannan, having repulsed the enemy in our extreme left, was sent by General Thomas to support the center, and at night took a position on the right of Reynolds.

Colonel Wilders brigade of mounted infantry occupied during the day a position on the La Fayette road, 1 mile north of Gordons Mills, where he had taken position on the afternoon previous when, contesting the ground step by step, he had been driven by the enemys advance from Alexanders Bridge.

Mintys cavalry had been ordered from the same position about noon of the 19th, to report to Major-General Granger, at Rossville, which he did at daylight on the 20th, and was posted near Mission Mills, to hold in check the enemys cavalry on their right, from the direction of Ruggold and Graysville.

The Reserve Corps covered the approaches from the Chickamauga toward Rossville and the extension of our left.

The roar of battle hushed in the darkness of night, and our troops, weary with a night of marching and a day of fighting, rested on their arms, having everywhere maintained their positions, developed the enemy, and gained thorough command of the Rossville and Dry Valley roads to Chattanooga, the great object of the battle of the 19th of September.

The battle had secured us these objects. Our flanks covered the Dry Valley and Rossville roads, while our cavalry covered the Missionary Ridge and the Valley of Chattanooga Creek, into which latter place our spare trains had been sent on Friday, the 18th.

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We also had indubitable evidence of the presence of Longstreets corps and Johnstons forces, by the capture of prisoners from each, and the fact that at the close of the day we had present but two brigades which had not been opportunely and squarely in action, opposed to superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were greatly outnumbered, and that the battle the next day must be for the safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga.